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The concepts of legitimacy and democracy are often used in conjunction with each other. This is 
because most people – at least, most people in the West today – believe that government has to be 
democratic in order to be legitimate. Legitimate government, many of us think, is democratic 
government. But legitimacy and democracy are two different concepts. Legitimacy concerns 
whether government is or should be regarded as valid by those subject to it. Democracy is a form of 
government in which the people rule themselves or in which all citizens have the opportunity to take 
an equal part in ruling, whether directly or indirectly by electing representatives. 
Legitimacy and democracy can be approached from many different angles. Both 
concepts have been widely discussed in a number of disciplines, for example, sociology, law, political 
science, history and philosophy. The approach in this chapter does not fall squarely within one 
discipline; it focuses on conceptual issues (what legitimacy and democracy mean) and normative 
issues (the value of democracy). In discussing democracy, I also draw attention to the historical 
differences between ancient and modern democracy, but this contrast is also aimed at better 
understanding what democracy might be and why it has been seen as a legitimate form of 
government. 
The chapter begins by considering legitimacy and introduces Max Weber’s (1864–
1920) influential understanding of the concept. The focus of the first section is the difference 
between empirical and normative legitimacy. The next section historicises and challenges the 
common understanding that democracy can be defined by universal suffrage, representation, party 
competition and majority rule. I do this by contrasting ancient and modern democracy, 
institutionally as well as in terms of fundamental values, and by discussing some conceptual and 
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normative issues pertaining to the common understanding of democracy. This is followed by a 
presentation of different understandings of what makes democracy legitimate. I focus on the 
distinction between instrumental and intrinsic justifications of democracy, that is, on whether the 
value of democracy lies in its good consequences or in its inherent features such as equality and 
freedom. Finally, I discuss the idea that democracy is characterised by its radical openness to 
contestation and difference.  
 
Legitimacy 
We live in  political societies, where our actions are regulated by common, coercive institutions and 
we are subject to binding decisions, laws and policies. In short, we are subject to political power. The 
issue of political legitimacy is connected to the exercise of and submission to power embedded in 
institutions and common practices, laws and policies, and in persons with authority. The question of 
the legitimacy of power is a question of whether such power is accepted, or should be accepted, as 
proper by those it is exercised over. Thus, the issue of legitimacy arises because political power 
cannot be based merely on custom, material self-interest or affect, but also involves an element of 
validity (Weber, 1978:213f; Dryzek, 2010:21; Barker, 1990:20f). 
 
Empirical and normative legitimacy 
It is ambiguous to say that political power must also include an element of validity. This may be 
understood in one of two ways. First, it may be understood empirically; without an element of 
validity, the exercise of power will not (as a matter of fact) be accepted as legitimate by those 
subject to it. Second, it may be understood normatively; without an element of validity, the exercise 
of power should not (as a matter of principle) be accepted as legitimate by those subject to it. For 
this reason, it is necessary to distinguish between two ways of understanding legitimacy: empirical 
legitimacy and normative legitimacy. Empirical legitimacy concerns whether those subject to power 
actually, as a matter of observable fact, do regard the power to which they are subject as valid. 
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Normative legitimacy concerns whether those subject to power ought – that is, have good (moral) 
reasons – to regard specific forms of power as valid or not. 
The most influential formulation of the empirical understanding of legitimacy comes 
from the German sociologist Max Weber (1978:213ff). According to Weber, every system of political 
domination depends for its stability on the people’s belief in its legitimacy. This ‘belief in legitimacy’ 
(Legitimitätsglaube) can be observed in the attitudes and conduct of the people subject to the 
power in question. It is important to note that, for Weber, belief in legitimacy cannot be reduced to 
or inferred from submissiveness to power. Submissiveness to power might be a consequence of 
opportunism, material self-interest, helplessness or lack of alternatives. These reasons for accepting 
and submitting to political power do not in and by themselves amount to a belief in the legitimacy of 
the power to which one submits. In Weber’s account, one must accept the claim of the legitimacy of 
power as valid in order to have a belief in its legitimacy. 
The empirical belief in the legitimacy of particular regimes is something social 
scientists can and have attempted to measure. It is of empirical interest to know whether a 
particular people believe their regime to be legitimate, for example in order to determine the 
stability of that regime. While empirical social scientists study particular societies and aim to explain 
the causes and effects of empirical legitimacy, political theorists and philosophers focus on the 
moral justifiability and acceptability of different forms of regime (Beetham, 1991:3f; Estlund, 
2008:2). 
Both the empirical and normative understandings of legitimacy concern the validity of 
claims to legitimate power. What distinguishes empirical and normative accounts of legitimacy is 
that in the first type of account validity is something that can be measured based on the relevant 
persons’ subjective beliefs, while the second type of account aims to set up objective criteria of 
validity. According to normative accounts of legitimacy, it is not sufficient for the validity of a regime 
that those subject to it regard it as valid and legitimate; they must have a preponderance of good 
reasons for doing so (Habermas, 1975:97f). Thus, while from an empirical perspective we are 
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interested in whether a particular regime is in fact accepted as valid by those living under it, the 
normative concern is whether the regime is acceptable. Which regimes are normatively acceptable is 
determined by the degree to which the regime approaches certain ideals. Different normative 
theories will specify and justify different ideals that a regime must meet or approximate in order to 
be legitimate. Below, I present theories that regard democratic ideals as the ideals that a regime 
must meet in order to be legitimate; but there are also normative theories that defend other ideals 
and therefore defend other types of regime as legitimate, from Plato’s philosopher kings to medieval 
theories of the divine right of kings. 
 
Legality and legitimacy 
Before we come to democracy, we must consider the relationship between legitimacy and legality. 
We are sometimes told that power is exercised legitimately insofar as it is exercised in accordance 
with established law. This equation of legitimacy with legal validity is common among lawyers. We 
also find an understanding of legitimacy that comes close to this equation of legitimacy and legality 
in Weber’s notion of legal authority (Weber, 1978:217ff). However, the idea that legitimacy is only a 
matter of legality – of following established legal procedures – raises the question of whether the 
established legal procedure itself is legitimate (Habermas, 1975:98). The latter question can be 
raised both empirically (are established legal procedures accepted as legitimate by those subject to 
them?) and normatively (are established legal procedures acceptable from the perspective of 
rational and normative considerations?).  
The notion of legality, then, differs from both empirical legitimacy and normative 
legitimacy – which does not mean that legality might not be part of what both of the latter require. 
Indeed, it is likely that people accept as valid only power that is exercised according to some set of 
rules (Beetham, 1991:17f) and that a tenable conception of normative legitimacy includes the idea 




 Democracy, ancient and modern1 
Legitimacy is at the same time both a requirement of any political regime and a way of classifying 
different forms of regime (Barker, 1990:47). Today, many people think that democracy is the only 
legitimate form of political rule or, in other words, that ‘the people’ are the sole legitimate source of 
political power (Rosanvallon, 2011:1). But, historically, other forms of regime have been regarded as 
legitimate. Since the first known democracies emerged 2500 years ago, democratic rule has been 
the exception rather than the rule (Dahl, 1998:4). 
For  the Western people of the 21st century, the word ‘democracy’ brings to mind men 
and women from all walks of life voting for representatives every four years or so, political parties 
competing for power and decision-making by majority rule. This, however, is a very unhistorical and 
also a conceptually problematical way of understanding democracy. In earlier times, until the late 
18th century, people would have associated the term democracy with free men assembling to discuss 
and make decisions in common, rather than with the idea of all adult citizens, men and women, 
electing others to discuss and make decisions on their behalf. 
The term democracy comes from the ancient Greek demokratia, which is a 
combination of demos and kratos, people and rule. The Greek city-state Athens was the home of the 
most significant ancient democracy, the one we know most about and the one that has influenced 
later political theory the most. Athens was a demokratia from 508/7 to 322/1 BCE (Hansen, 1999:3; 
Dahl, 1998:11ff). Athenian democracy differs considerably from contemporary democracy, since it 
was a direct democracy to which electing representatives and political parties were foreign. Indeed, 
among the Athenians, elections were seen as aristocratic institutions, while choice by lot was 
regarded as the democratic way of selecting citizens to public duties (Aristotle, Pol. 1294b7–9, 
1992:262; Manin, 1997:ch.1).  
 
Size, representation and the people 
                                                          
1
 I would like to thank Mogens Herman Hansen for comments on this section. 
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Contemporary democracies differ from ancient democracies in that they are much larger – around    
300,000 people lived in Athens in the 4th century BCE, about 30,000 of whom were adult males with 
full political rights (Hansen, 1999:90ff, 327f), while the world’s largest democracy today, India, has 
1.2 billion inhabitants – and also by what James Madison (one of the chief architects of the American 
Constitution) called ‘the scheme of representation’. Because the United States has such a central 
place in the contemporary understanding of democracy, it is interesting to note that the American 
founding fathers made a distinction between the form of government they were creating and 
democracy. Madison did not regard the Constitution of 1787 as establishing a democracy, which for 
him denoted a direct democracy, but a republic, which is characterised by “the delegation of the 
government … to a small number of citizens elected by the rest” (Hamilton et al., 1999:49f; cf. Dahl, 
1998:16f; Manin, 1997:1ff). It is not until around the late 1820s that representative government 
came to be seen as a form of democracy. This change is most clearly indicated in the title of Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s famous Democracy in America (1988), the two volumes of which were published in 
1835 and 1840, respectively. 
In one of the central texts in the development of democratic theory, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s (1712–1778) On the Social Contract (1762) representation is seen as antithetical to the 
freedom of and rule by the people: “The English people believes itself to be free. It is greatly 
mistaken; it is free only during the election of members of parliament. Once they are elected, the 
populace is enslaved; it is nothing” (Rousseau, 1987:198). Thus, even if electing representatives is at 
the heart of present day democracies, representation cannot be seen as obviously democratic from 
the perspective of the history of democratic ideas and practice. 
The etymological meaning of democracy is, as mentioned, rule by the people. In 
democratic theory and practice, the people, or demos, refers to those persons who have political 
rights, that is, the right to participate in ruling, directly or indirectly. Who is included in ‘the people’ 
has changed greatly historically. Today, we regard universal suffrage, the idea that every adult 
citizen should have the right to vote, as a defining feature of democracy. This idea, however, is only 
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around 100 years old. Until the 20th century, half of all adults – women – were denied the right to 
vote and run for office in all established democracies. In most countries, women did not win the 
right to vote until around the time of the First World War; in Switzerland this did not happen until as 
late as the 1970s. Before the 20th century, the vote among adult men was restricted by other 
requirements, mainly property qualifications. As late as 1831, for example, only 5 per cent of the 
population over the age of 20 had the right to vote in Great Britain (Dahl, 1998:23f). In ancient 
Athens only male citizens, around a tenth of the inhabitants, could participate in the political 
assembly; women, slaves and metics (resident foreigners) were excluded (Hansen, 1999:86ff).  
We must distinguish between a regime that is democratic with respect to its demos 
and a regime that is democratic with respect to everyone subject to its laws (Dahl, 1989:122). It is 
possible for a regime to be very democratic in relation to its own demos while at the same time 
having a very exclusionary understanding of who belongs to the demos. When some are excluded 
from enjoying political rights, as slaves have been historically and as resident foreigners are to this 
day, we have the rule of citizens over non-citizens, which, it has been argued, “is probably the most 
common form of tyranny in human history” (Walzer, 1983:62). 
 
Political parties 
“Modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties,” a political scientist wrote 70 years 
ago (cf. Muirhead, 2010:130); and indeed, in the 200-year history of modern, representative 
democracy, political parties have played a central role in recruiting and educating candidates, 
running campaigns and organising the governing majority and opposition (Muirhead, 2010:132). It is 
important to note, however, first, that political parties did not exist in ancient democracy (Hansen, 
1999:306) and, second, that parties were not regarded as necessary for democracy by many of its 
founding theorists and practitioners. Indeed, both Rousseau, who had a profound influence on the 
French Revolution of 1789, and Madison, who (as has been mentioned) was one of the American 
founding fathers, saw political parties as detrimental to a politics aimed at the common good 
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(Rousseau, 1987:156; Hamilton et al, 1999:45ff). But the practice of representative government 
since the late 18th century has taught us that political parties are indispensable to modern, 
democratic politics. Thus, shortly after the founding of the US federal government, Madison realised 
that parties were necessary in a republic, even if they were necessary evils, and in 1791 he took part 
in establishing the Democratic-Republican Party (Elkins & McKitrick, 1993:267).  
 
Majority rule 
Finally, we come to the common idea that democracy is identical to majority rule. It is not 
historically wrong to claim this, in way that it is historically wrong to say that democracy is a matter 
of universal suffrage or electing representatives from different political parties; it is, rather, 
conceptually and normatively problematic. The problem is apparent when we note that the ideal of 
democracy is that the whole of the people rules, while evidently majority rule is rule only by a part 
of the people. In other words, the trouble with equating democracy with decision-making by the 
majority is that it confuses a principle of legitimacy (‘the sole source of legitimate power is the 
people’) and a technical decision-making procedure (‘the majority should decide’) (Arendt, 
1990:164; Rosanvallon, 2011:1f).  
Now, the point is not that democracies should never use the device of majority 
decision-making or that there are no good democratic reasons for letting the majority decide 
(clearly, letting the majority rather than the minority decide is more in line with the democratic 
principle of political equality). The point is that majority decision-making is merely a procedure that 
aims to meet a higher, perhaps unreachable, ideal of rule by the people as a whole.  
 
Ideals and institutions 
We have seen that some of the key institutions of contemporary democracies – periodic election of 
representatives, universal suffrage, political parties and majority rule – are neither universal features 
of all historically existing democracies nor endorsed by all democratic theorists. One may wonder, 
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then, first, whether ancient demokratia (a form of direct democracy) and modern democracy 
(representative government) share anything but similar sounding names. It is evident that modern 
democracies have not copied the key institutions of Athenian democracy such as the popular 
assembly, which was composed of all adult male citizens, and selection to official duties by lot 
(Hansen, 2005:20ff). Nevertheless, even if modern democracies are institutionally very different 
from ancient democracies, the ideals of the latter might have been influential in shaping modern 
democracy (Dahl, 1989:14). If the ideals are the same (or similar), we may wonder, secondly, which 
institutions best approximate the realisation of these ideals. Whatever the answer to these 
questions, it is important to understand that the ideals of democracy and the institutions of 
democracy are two different things. Institutions may be seen as pragmatic devices designed to 
realise the ideals. 
It is a historically complicated matter to determine exactly what were the ideals of 
Athenian democracy and to what extent they have influenced contemporary understandings. We 
will have to bypass these complications and simply note the apparent similarities between ancient 
and modern ideals of democracy. Interestingly, no ancient philosopher gave a positive description of 
the ideals of Athenian democracy. The two most important philosophers from that period are Plato 
(428–347 BCE) and Aristotle (384–322 BCE), and they were highly critical of democracy, the first 
more so than the latter. Both of them mention freedom and equality as the core democratic ideals 
(Plato, Rep. 557b, 558c, 1992:227f; Aristotle, Pol. 1317a40 ff, 1992:362f). The best known 
celebration of Athenian democracy is due to the statesman Pericles (c. 495–425 BCE): “Our 
constitution is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of a minority but of the whole 
people … And just as our political life is free and open, so is our day-to-day life in our relations with 
each other” (Thucydides, 1972: II.37, p.145). There are, of course, differences between the accents 
of the democracy critics Plato and Aristotle and the democracy celebrator Pericles, but they share 
the description of democracy as characterised by ideals of freedom and equality in both political and 




What makes democratic government legitimate? 
Why should we (if we should) regard democratic government as legitimate? What kinds of ideals or 
values does democracy express, protect or promote that make it a valid or morally desirable form of 
government – or more so than other forms of government? These are the types of question that 
normative democratic theory attempts to answer. To begin with, it should be noted that it is not 
naturally plausible, despite what many in the democratic world today feel, that all adults should 
have the right to participate in ruling. Wouldn’t it, for example, be more sensible to leave the rule of 
nation-states to people who have special qualifications, rather than allowing everyone to have a say 
in how to govern such a complex body? What are the ideals and reasons that can and have been 
given that political rule must be democratic in order to be legitimate? 
Philosophers commonly distinguish between instrumental values and intrinsic values. 
Something has instrumental value when it is a means to something else that has value as an end. If 
we explain the legitimacy of democracy with reference to its instrumental value, we invoke some 
end that democratic decision-making tends to further, such as good laws. Something has intrinsic 
value if it is good in and of itself. Thus, if we explain the legitimacy of democracy with reference to 
its intrinsic value, we appeal to some value inherent in democratic decision-making that is 
independent of its consequences, for example its inherent fairness (Christiano, 2006). 
 
Instrumental justifications of democracy 
One instrumental justification for the legitimacy of democracy is precisely that democracies produce 
good – wise and just – laws. But why would anyone think that democracies have a tendency to 
produce better laws than, for example, regimes in which the wisest rule? A prominent answer has to 
do with the knowledge of and care for the interests of the people. Good laws are laws that promote 
the interests of the populace or of those subject to the laws. The assumptions of democratic 
theorists who make this argument are, first, that no one knows what is in a person’s interest better 
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than the person herself; and, second, that no one cares as much about someone’s interests as the 
person whose interest it is (Dahl, 1989:101, 103). One famous expositor of this argument is John 
Stuart Mill (1806–1873), who notes that one reason for the superiority of democracy is “that the 
rights and interests of every or any person are only secure from being disregarded, when the person 
interested is himself able, and habitually disposed, to stand up for them” (Mill, 1991:245). 
We should distinguish here between two instrumental views. The first view holds 
(optimistically) that the democratic process can aggregate and further the people’s interests, 
because political processes in which each person speaks for herself have the epistemic value of 
citizens learning what they want to do together. The second (more pessimistic) view holds that the 
best that can be said of democracy is that, through the vote, citizens can protect their interests 
against tyrannical rule. In this view, democratic processes cannot fulfil the goal of ascertaining what 
is the common interest of the people; rather, democracy gains its legitimacy from the fact that, 
through the vote, citizens have a veto and can threaten rulers from being oppressive (Riker, 
1982:241ff). 
A second instrumental argument for democracy relates to the educational 
consequences of having the opportunity to take part in government. The idea here is that 
democratic institutions have positive effects on the character of the citizens. Whereas non-
democratic regimes create passive citizens or subjects, democracy promotes active, self-dependent 
citizens. We find this argument also in J.S. Mill (1991:ch.3), who argues that democracy promotes 
both moral virtue and intellectual capacities among citizens, because participating in government 
requires learning to be impartial and the seeking of knowledge of the most complicated matters. 
Some later political theorists have agreed that the main justification of democracy is its positive 
effect on human character, but they have argued that this salutary effect of democracy requires a 
more participatory model of democracy than the one we have today, one, for example, in which 




Intrinsic justifications of democracy 
Let us turn to the intrinsic values of democracy. One key intrinsic justification of democracy is that it 
is a form of rule that expresses or realises the freedom of citizens; or, in other words, that 
democratic rule is the solution to the problem of combining the necessity of coercion and the ideal 
of freedom. This was the problem that Rousseau set for himself in On the Social Contract: “Find a 
form of association which defends and protects with all common forces the person and goods of 
each associate, and by means of which each one, while uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only 
himself and remains as free as before” (Rousseau 1987: 148). In a democracy, citizens can remain 
free because the coercion (the laws) to which they are subject springs from themselves. Democracy 
in this view is morally superior to other forms of government because it realises the value of being 
the author of the laws one obeys. In other words, democratic rule is legitimate because it embodies 
the great value of freedom, which means not being ruled by others but only by oneself. 
One may ask, however, whether democracy really entails that one rules oneself. 
Doesn’t democracy, rather, entail that some (the majority) rule others (the minority)? The objection 
is that the Rousseauian ideal of freedom requires unanimity on every law, because only thus can 
each be the author of the law to which she is subject; and such unanimity is utterly unrealistic 
(Wolff, 1998:22f). Joseph Schumpeter is also sceptical of the idea that democratic procedures secure 
popular self-legislation: “Evidently the will of the majority is the will of the majority and not the will 
of ‘the people’” (Schumpeter, 1975:272). Schumpeter rejects that the people can ever rule itself and 
defends a ‘realistic’ and elitist model of democracy, according to which democracy is an institutional 
arrangement in which elites compete for the people’s vote (Schumpeter, 1975:269). 
Now, while all democratic theorists agree that unanimity on every law is unrealistic, 
some hold on to the idea that the legitimacy of democracy is grounded in the ideal that it makes 
citizens self-legislators. One argument is that the core of democratic self-legislation is not the act of 
deciding that is executed at the moment of voting, but the discussion and deliberation that precede 
and follow the vote and that make every decision provisional and reversible. The legitimacy of 
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democracy does not lie in majority decision-making as such, but in the ideal that “the decision 
reached by the majority only represents a caesura in an ongoing discussion; the decision records, so 
to speak, the interim result of a discursive opinion-forming process” (Habermas, 1996:179). Such a 
deliberative conception of democratic self-legislation entails a more complex understanding of 
freedom, according to which one may be free even if one disagrees with particular laws, as long as 
collective decisions are affected by the deliberative contributions of everyone, and as long as 
decisions are seen as fallible and reversible and therefore subject to further discussion by the people 
as a whole (Rostbøll 2008:104f; cf. Anderson 2009:215ff). 
Equality is the second value that may be regarded as being part of democratic 
decision-making and thus as providing an intrinsic explanation of the legitimacy of democracy. The 
equality argument for the value of democracy may be seen (but does not have to be seen) as an 
alternative to the freedom justification of democracy. The idea here is that what makes democracy 
legitimate is not that everyone actually legislates for herself, but rather that democracy is the only 
form of government that publicly recognises everyone as equals (Christiano, 2008). 
It is not an uncomplicated matter to explain how democracy treats everyone as 
equals. To begin with, we may say that democracy respects the intrinsic equality of citizens, in the 
sense that it rejects that some people are owed special consideration merely because of their birth 
or social status. In democracies, “everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one”, as the 
father of modern utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham, puts it (Dahl, 1989:86). This idea entails a principle 
of equal consideration of interests. Robert A. Dahl (1989:87f, 99) has argued that the ideal of 
intrinsic equality and the principle of equal consideration of interests are not sufficient for explaining 
the need for democratic decision-making. In principle, a benevolent despot could be committed to 
considering everyone’s interest equally and in this sense rule for the people. Democracy, however, is 
14 
 
not merely rule for the people (that is, rule in the interest of the people), but also rule by the 
people.2 
The equality that is embodied in democratic procedures is not merely equal 
consideration of the interests of each and every person but includes, in addition, the presumption 
that everyone is equally qualified to rule themselves. The latter presumption entails that each is the 
best judge of her own interests and corresponds to the rejection of paternalistic rule, that is, the 
rejection of the notion that those who know better should rule those who lack insight for the latter’s 
own good (Dahl, 1989:99f; cf. Rostbøll, 2005). So in this view, democracy is legitimate because 
democratic decision-making has the intrinsic value of treating everyone as equals and expressing 
respect for everyone as equally capable of judging what is good for them.    
 
Instrumental vs. non-instrumental value of democracy 
We have seen that democratic legitimacy may be explained with reference to either instrumental or 
intrinsic values. You may now ask why it matters whether democracy is justified instrumentally or 
intrinsically. One reason is that instrumental values are conditional values while intrinsic values are 
unconditional values. Instrumental values are conditional values because they are valuable if, and 
only if, they in fact contribute to the realisation of some other value that is an end in itself. Thus, for 
example, if one explains the legitimacy of democracy with reference to the idea that it is a means to 
producing good laws or promoting virtuous and intelligent citizens, this argument is conditional 
upon one being able to show empirically that democracies in fact do make better laws and do 
promote certain character types. This is not easy to do. Intrinsic justifications for the value of 
democracy do not have this problem, because the idea that freedom and equality are intrinsic 
features of democracy is not susceptible to empirical objections of the sort that instrumental 
justifications are. Of course, this does not mean that intrinsic justifications are immune to other 
objections. 
                                                          
2
 In his Gettysburg address, Abraham Lincoln (1809–1865) famously defined democracy as “government of the 
people, by the people, for the people” (Lincoln, 1991:104). 
15 
 
A second reason to distinguish instrumental and intrinsic justifications of democracy is 
to highlight the fact that sometimes we value something as good in itself, independently of its 
consequences. When I value my individual freedom, this entails also valuing the right to make bad 
decisions. Similarly, the right to collective self-determination that defines democracy entails the 
right to make suboptimal decisions. In order to understand that there can be moral value in the 
intrinsic properties of democratic procedures – of either being self-legislating or being treated as an 
equal – we need to understand that not all values are instrumental values (which is not well 
understood in a culture dominated by market thinking). 
On the other hand, it may be argued that intrinsic values cannot be entirely 
independent of instrumental ones. It seems implausible to suggest that we still would and should 
value democracy if it turned out that democratic decision-making resulted in catastrophically unwise 
and unjust laws and policies and there were instrumentally better alternatives.  
One contemporary argument against the purely intrinsic argument for democracy is 
made by David Estlund (2008:ch.4). According to Estlund, it is impossible to explain the legitimacy 
and authority of democracy without reference to the quality of outcomes. If all we care about is 
fairness or equal treatment, why not just flip a coin? A coin flip is fair and treats everyone equally. 
Estlund’s argument is that the reason we value voting, where people can express their preferences 
and judgments, is because we care not only about the intrinsic fairness of the procedure but also 
about the quality of the outcomes. Democrats believe everyone should have a say in the political 
process, because they believe this contributes to making decisions that advance their preferences – 
and not simply because they think it is intrinsically fair.  
There are also problems in seeing democracy purely in instrumental terms. One 
common view of democracy is that its value and legitimacy is derived from the fact that democratic 
mechanisms such as voting are the best way to ensure that government satisfies citizens’ individual 
preferences. In this instrumentalist view, the purpose of politics and government is the same as that 
of the market. We may, therefore, call this the economic or market conception of democracy, which 
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is most clearly expressed in social choice theory. Since the late 1980s, this market or aggregative 
model of democracy has been challenged by deliberative democracy. Deliberative democrats reject 
that “democracy is a generic preference satisfaction mechanism” (Anderson, 2009:222). The social 
choice model “embodies a confusion between the kind of behavior that is appropriate in the market 
place and that which is appropriate in the forum” (Elster, 1997:10). In the market place it is 
acceptable to choose according to what is good for oneself, but in the forum one must also consider 
how one’s choices affect others, what is just and what we want together as a democratic 
community. 
According to deliberative democrats, then, the purpose of democratic government is 
not merely to aggregate individual preferences but rather to publicly deliberate and mutually justify 
to each other, which laws and policies are just and in the common good (Cohen, 1997; Manin, 1987). 
In this deliberative model, democracy is not instrumentally valuable in the simple sense of being 
merely a means to satisfy goals that existed before or independently of the political process. Only in 
the deliberative process do citizens learn which goals they want to pursue together as a public, 
rather than as separate individuals (Anderson, 2009:222f; Rostbøll, 2008:176ff).  
 
Democracy and openness 
From a different theoretical perspective, it has been suggested that the legitimacy of democracy lies 
in the fact that only in democracies is it accepted that there are no final answers; in this view, 
democracy is characterised by its openness to contestation. Ernesto Laclau (1996:35), for example, 
writes, “If democracy is possible, it is because the universal has no necessary body and no necessary 
content; different groups, instead, compete between themselves to temporarily give to their 
particularisms a function of universal representation”. The idea is that there is no final truth and that 
democracy honours this condition of politics by being radically open to different interpretations of 
what is true and right. 
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It could be asked whether this (poststructuralist) view means that everything is up for 
grabs, whether there are no normative guidelines for the contestation at all. If that is the case, it 
becomes unclear why democratic (that is, peaceful, egalitarian and deliberative) contestation is 
more legitimate than other forms of contestation – violent contestation, for example. It may be 
responded that violence does not honour the conditions of politics, its radical openness. But if there 
is no content to the universal, no truths or norms, why, then, should we accept this openness? 
Doesn’t this view require that acceptance of openness is a fundamental norm? 
An alternative way of understanding the openness of democracy is to say that the 
value of democracy is indeed based on disagreement on and contestation of fundamental norms, 
but that this contestation must be guided by fundamental normative principles. We find this idea in 
Seyla Benhabib’s notion of democratic iterations: “iterative acts through which a democratic people 
that considers itself bound by certain guiding norms and principles reappropriates and reinterprets 
these, thus showing itself to be not only the subject but also the author of laws” (Benhabib, 
2004:181). In Benhabib, the parties are guided by meta-norms of universal respect, which “means 
that we recognize the rights of all beings capable of speech and action to be participants in the 
moral conversation”, and egalitarian reciprocity, which requires “that in discourses each should have 
the same rights to various speech acts, to initiate new topics, and to ask for justification of the 
presuppositions of the conversations” (Benhabib, 2004:13). According to this view, the exact 
meaning and implications of these fundamental norms can be contested and reinterpreted, but the 
meta-norms cannot be rejected without also losing the very possibility of acting democratically and 
understanding the legitimacy of democracy (Rostbøll, 2010:416f). 
 
Conclusion 
Legitimacy concerns whether those who are subject to specific forms of power accept (empirically) 
or should accept (normatively) this power as valid. We have noted that many people today regard 
democratic government as the only legitimate form of government. The treatment of democracy in 
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this chapter has proceeded as a discussion of normative legitimacy in the sense that we have 
considered what reasons people have to regard democratic decision-making as the most legitimate 
form of political decision-making. This is a different issue from the empirical questions of whether 
and why people in fact do regard democratic government as legitimate.  
While contemporary normative political theorists tend to agree that democratic 
government is legitimate, there is, as we have seen, much less agreement on why democracy is 
legitimate. We have surveyed a number of different ideas and arguments that are thought to explain 
the value and legitimacy of democracy, and we have considered the pros and cons of the different 
instrumental and intrinsic justifications of democracy. The purpose of this survey has been to 
introduce to the reader some key debates in democratic theory, rather than to give a definitive 
answer to the question of what makes democracy legitimate. 
A short chapter like this cannot hope to do justice to the enormous literature on 
legitimacy and democracy or to the challenges posed by real world developments to thinking about 
and realising legitimate government and/or democracy. For democratic theorists and practitioners, 
one of the fundamental challenges today is to adjust our understanding of democracy to a globalised 
world. Democracy began as direct democracy in small city-states and was much later adjusted to 
large nation-states as representative government. Today, we need to consider how democracy 
might adopt to “the post-national constellation” (Habermas, 2001). Can supranational organisations 
such as the EU be democratic and, if so, how? Might we even need a global democracy to match 
economic globalisation? What would that look like, and could it ever be legitimate (Held, 1995)? 
These are difficult questions but if democracy does not extend beyond the nation-state, it could be 
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